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Task Allocation and Corporate Performance:
Is There a First-Mover Advantage?
Michael Beckmann∗, Kathrin Armbruster†, and Dieter Kuhn‡
Abstract
Although the performance effects of multitasking were analyzed intensively in the past, little is
known about the impact of the adoption time of multitasking on corporate performance. Possibly,
the quantity of the reorganization is crucial and early movers experience a comparative competitive
advantage; but also quality effects could dominate and late adoption is beneficial. The present
paper examines the performance effects of the implementation time of teamwork and job rotation
using two nationally representative Swiss firm-level datasets. To account for potential endogeneity,
two separate two-stage estimation strategies are applied. According to the results, there are slight
late-mover disadvantages when implementing teamwork. In contrast, the influence of the adoption
of job rotation heavily depends on the observation time, though late adoption is mainly associated
with lower performance. These findings indicate that there are both quantity and quality effects,
dependent on how established and complex the multitasking instrument is.
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1 Introduction
Firstness is always beneficial - this view is usually hold in the context of firms. Due to cultural im-
prints and personal experiences managers often conclude that being first is generally advantageous.
The academic literature, however, does not generally confirm this assumption. In contrast, moving
first may also be harmful for firms (Bolton 2007). The present paper examines the assumption of
first-mover advantages regarding the adoption of multitasking instruments. Since several decades,
firms change its job design from a Tayloristic to a so-called holistic work organization. In this
regard, also the allocation of tasks within a firm changes: Instead of task specialization that
promotes a stringent separation of qualitatively different tasks between jobs, employees experi-
ence multitasking that is associated with an accumulation of heterogeneous tasks within jobs.
Human Resource (HR) instruments belonging to this new job design are for example teamwork
or job rotation (a systematic change of workplaces). Although the effects of these changes in job
design on corporate performance were analyzed intensively in the last years, the impact of the
timing of the implementation was neglected so far. Thus, the present paper examines whether
the timing of reorganization within the firm towards multitasking influences corporate performance.
Analyzing the impact of the timing of reorganization, one can think of two possible effects.
First, firms which have introduced multitasking faster than their competitors could achieve a
comparative competitive advantage. According to this, first movers in implementing multitasking
are likely to achieve a higher performance than late adopters. Second, one could also argue the
contrary. Possibly late adopters, i.e., firms that take more time in reorganizing, experience a
comparative performance advantage, because their implementation quality is superior to that of
their competitors. Perhaps, a firm’s performance has less to do with the time aspect involved in
introducing multitasking and much more to do with the qualitative aspects involved.
Previous empirical investigations analyze on the one hand performance effects of multitasking and
on the other hand first-mover and late-adopter effects in the context of market entry. Team-
work shows by trend positive effects on fim performance whereas job rotation exhibits no or even
negative impact (e.g., Bacon and Blyton 2000, Banker et al. 1996, Chadwick 2007, Vlachos 2008,
Zwick 2002). Concerning timing effects of reorganization, Cebon and Love (2002) find a poor
performance of late adopters of "Best Practices" in manufacturing firms. Ben-Ner and Lluis (2011)
and Jirjahn et al. (2011) find learning effects of codetermination and of adjustments in workplace
organization. Investigating the timing of market entry the assumption of the preference of firstness
is not confirmed generally. Moving first or late does not have clear positive or negative effects.
Previous investigations also have shown that the costs of early adoption, the endogeneity of the
choice to adopt, and the temporary nature of timing effects potentially lead to biased results.
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However, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, no paper has analyzed the performance effects of
the adoption time of multitasking so far. This paper intends to fill this gap.
The aim of the present paper is therefore to analyze empirically whether there is a time effect
when changing the task allocation. Particularly, it is analyzed whether quantity or quality effects
dominate when firms implement multitasking. This research question is analyzed using two
nationally representative Swiss firm-level datasets from 2000 and 2008. These surveys contain
questions about the adoption time of teamwork and job rotation. According to this information,
firms are assigned as first movers, average movers, late adopters, or no adopters at all. Data about
productivity and profitability of each firm deliver information about firm performance.
The implementation of multitasking is likely an endogenous decision and firms self-select due to
observed and unobserved characteristics. It is for example possible, that especially successful
managers, who improve firm performance, also introduce multitasking earlier than their com-
petitors. In this case, the resulting estimates would be biased and the effect of early moving
would be overestimated. But it could also be that less successful managers reorganize early to
improve. In that case, the estimates would underestimate the true impact of early implementation.
For that reason, the methodological procedure is as follows: At first, an OLS regression is es-
timated. These estimation results could be biased due to endogeneity. Therefore, in a second
part an endogeneity correction introduced by Dubin and McFadden (1984) is implemented in
order to account for the self selection of firms towards the implementation time of multitasking.
The analysis contains firms with and without multitasking. Finally, an endogenous switching
regression model is applied which accounts for the self selection towards the basic decision to use
multitasking and which observes only firms that already use multitasking.
The paper proceeds as follows: Chapter 2 describes the theoretical background for the research
question. After that, literature related to performance effects of the allocation of tasks as well as
to first-mover and late-adopter effects is presented. Chapter 4 shows the empirical investigation
with data, variables, descriptive statistics, and the econometric modeling. Afterwards, the results
of the empirical analysis are presented. Finally, section 6 concludes.
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2 Theoretical Considerations
2.1 Task Allocation and Corporate Performance
For a long time, HR practices were seen as a source of costs to be minimized. In the meantime,
these practices shall also contribute to the scope of the firm business (Becker and Gerhart 1996).
Multitasking instruments may have positive and negative effects on firm performance. In the
following, the positive effects are described. Multitasking enables one a better use of information
due to a simplified information transfer and decreased adjustment costs. Firms can use the specific
local knowledge that employees have compared to management (cf. Levine 1995). As a result, the
production process may be organized more effectively or the quality of services and products is
improved. Working cooperatively in teams or changing the workplace regularly also yields superior
communication channels (Jones and Svejnar 1985). A further information effect arises from the
peer pressure which reduces monitoring and supervision costs (Jones and Svejnar 1985, Pfeffer
2005) and enables one the introduction of incentives. Furthermore, management can concentrate
on strategic tasks instead of engaging in every-day business (Lazear and Gibbs 2009).
A diverse allocation of tasks increases motivation by decreasing boredom and creating a more
diversified and interesting workplace. This motivates employees and brings them to show higher
effort, by what productivity increases. They show more engagement, have higher job satisfaction,
and lower absenteeism and turnover (Kling 1995). Employees having control develop a feeling of
ownership for the organization and the job (Pierce et al. 2004). Participation increases the goal
acceptance (Renn 1998), leads to a higher impression of perceived justice (Douthitt and Aiello
2001, Roberson et al. 1999), and therefore fosters task performance and satisfaction. Group-goal
setting is seen as one possibility to constrain social loafing and finally to increase motivation and
performance (Wegge and Haslam 2005).
Multitasking also exhibits a training effect. When changing the workplace regularly, the employees
experience on-the-job cross-training (Zwick 2002) and can therefore get deployed flexibly. Em-
ployees who work in teams learn from each other. This training enables the firm reacting quickly
to changes on the supply or demand market which in turn fosters firm performance (Chadwick
2007, Ichniowski and Shaw 1997, MacDuffie 1995).
Multitasking, however, may also have negative effects on firm performance. First, the reduced
authority of managers and the increased decision power of employees may lead to suboptimal
decisions because central information is used imperfectly. The need for a broad consensus in the
decision process also increases communication costs. Second, employees have discretionary effort
and potentially behave opportunistically and shirk. Monitoring costs, in turn, which shall prevent
inefficient behavior of agents, have also a negative impact on firm performance. Third, a broad
allocation of tasks prevents to exploit increasing returns to scale and interdependencies, which
4
would decrease production costs. Finally, in general also labor costs are higher when multitasking
is used (Alchian and Demsetz 1972, Jensen and Meckling 1976, Jones and Svejnar 1985).
2.2 Performance Effects of the Adoption Time
Regarding the effect of the timing of the implementation of reorganization on firm performance, two
opposed effects may accrue: The quantity or the quality of the implementation might dominate.
Because the effects of the reorganization time of job design were neglected so far, the argumentation
is mostly transferred from strategic management research. Although the decision to reorganize is
different from entering a market or introducing new products, several of the arguments can be
adopted.
2.2.1 Quantity Effects
According to the first hypothesis, first movers in implementing multitasking and decentralization
are likely to achieve a comparative performance advantage. This quantity effect suggests that
first movers experience the highest benefits from reorganization. Lieberman and Montgomery
(1988, p. 1) define first-mover advantages as the "ability of pioneering firms to earn positive
economic profits."1 As Addison and Belfield (2001, p. 357) phrase this idea in the context of
employee involvement, "establishments that were early to adopt a particular employee involvement
scheme may have experienced immediate gains to labor productivity not available to late adopters."
Below, the arguments in favor of a first mover advantage are illustrated. First movers benefit from
an experience or learning curve and can therefore accumulate superior resources and capabilities
faster than their competitors (cf. Ben-Ner and Lluis 2011, Jirjahn et al. 2011, Lieberman and
Montgomery 1988, Lieberman and Montgomery 1998). The costs for the use of multitasking
decrease with increasing time of usage like unit production costs. The introduction of teamwork
and job rotation leads to adjustment costs: Employees need to learn their new tasks, to cooperate
in a group, or to meet decisions independently. In addition, managers need to learn giving respon-
sibility to subordinates, leading group sessions, or organizing the systematic change of workplaces.
These adjustment processes, amongst others, need time for familiarization and lead finally to a
learning curve effect (Lieberman and Montgomery 1988).
Due to this learning curve effect, firms may accumulate superior resources and capabilities faster
than their competitors (cf. Lieberman and Montgomery 1988, Lieberman and Montgomery
1998). According to the resource-based view, Human Resource Management (HRM) supplies
the firm with unique resources which are scarce or can badly be imitated by competitors and
which therefore lead to a comparative advantage for the firm (e.g., Pfeffer 1994, Truss 2001).
Resources are for example the firm’s stock and intangible assets as well as employees’ individual
1In the case of market entry, Suarez and Lanzolla (2005, p. 2) define a first-mover advantage as "a firm’s ability
to be better off than its competitors as a result of being first to market in a new product category."
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skills; capabilities are the abilities of a firm to undertake a specific type of activity (Lieber-
man and Montgomery 1998).2 In the present case, these resources could for example be better
specific knowledge or the ability to react quickly to changing markets due to teamwork and job
rotation. The faster accumulation of superior resources and capabilities increases firm performance.
Furthermore, symbolic adoption and cultural incongruity may benefit first movers and harm late
adopters. When the early movement of firms is successful, further firms will adopt new job design.
In contrast to first movers, these late adopters possibly implement multitasking practices due
to institutional pressure. As a consequence, the instruments are adopted only symbolically and
inconsistently. Hence, late adopters do not experience the same positive performance effect first
movers have but perform poorer (Cebon and Love 2002). Firms that see the opportunity of new
job design lately might also have more difficulties to implement these instruments. These sort of
firms might not be suitable to a broad allocation of tasks because their culture is incongruent with
multitasking. Consequently, late adopters might perform worse than other firms due to cultural
incongruity (Cebon and Love 2002).
2.2.2 Quality Effects
On the contrary, there are also several reasons, why the quality effect is essential and late adopters
of multitasking experience a comparative competitive advantage. Late adopters have a shorter
learning curve and less uncertainty due to free-rider effects. Whether new and innovative HR
instruments are performance-enhancing and which conditions are necessary for a successful imple-
mentation turns out after several firms adopted them. To wait and to observe experiences of early
adopters can therefore be a rational way to save costs of failure (cf. Lieberman and Montgomery
1988). Late adopters may benefit from success and mistakes of the early implementers, so that
their learning curve turns out to be much shorter.
On contrast, first adopters face uncertainty when implementing new instruments and fail to
acquire the needed resources when the development goes on (cf. Lieberman and Montgomery
1998). This effect of resolved uncertainty is enforced by the non-protectable nature of innovative
HR instruments. They cannot be secured by patents and can therefore be imitated easily by late
adopters (cf. Lieberman and Montgomery 1988).3 Thus, imitation costs may be smaller than
invitation costs (cf. Lieberman and Montgomery 1988).
When multitasking is increasingly used, it is less attractive for employees. Thus, first movers
loose a unique feature. In contrast, late adopters can employ personnel which are already used
2Lieberman and Montgomery (1998, p. 1112) pose the following questions in order to identify the accumulation
of better resources and capabilites in strategic management: "First, under what conditions can early entry
enhance the firm’s accumulation of superior resources and capabilities?" and second, "Do the initial resources
and capabilities of a firm affect its optimal (and actual) timing of entry?"
3Dutta et al. (1993) model a situation where a first mover enters the market with a low quality product. The later
innovator has time to increase the quality and is later able to make higher profits when entering the market.
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to innovative work practices and therefore save adjustment costs. This argumentation proceeds
analogously to that of the free-rider effect in the labor market, where late entrants save screening
and training costs (cf. Guasch and Weiss 1980).
Finally, an incumbent inertia may lead to an inability to react to changing conditions of first
movers and may therefore benefit late adopters (Lieberman and Montgomery 1988). The argument
of sunk costs of firms that entered new markets or introduced new products may also apply here:
The introduction of holistic job design may cause high costs. These are partly direct costs, for
example for the composition of new workplaces or training costs for employees. Partly, these
are indirect costs like working time and productivity losses due to familiarization with the new
practices. As a consequence, the firms are not willing or not able to return to the previous system
even if the new job design is unsuccessful. Before changing the working system again, they want
to benefit from their investments (cf. MacMillan 1983, Tang 1988). This effect is intensified
by empirical findings, according to which the complete introduction of high performance work
systems generates the highest positive impact. Firms are forced to implement an overall change
in the job design which results in an even stronger lock-in.4
To sum, in the first case, first movers in implementing multitasking are likely to achieve a higher
performance than late adopters due to quantity aspects. In the latter case, late adopters, i.e., firms
that take more time in reorganizing, experience the comparative performance advantage, because
their implementation quality is superior to that of their competitors. In the case that both quantity
and quality aspects play a role, average adoption is beneficial for firms. The purpose of the present
paper is to analyze which effect turns out to be stronger. In the next chapter, the related literature
will be presented.
3 Related Literature
For the best of the authors’ knowledge, timing effects of the implementation of multitasking were
neglected so far. The presented literature therefore refers on the one hand to performance effects
of multitasking and to previous research on timing effects on the other. Because the literature is
very comprehensive in both cases, some selected studies are shown.
3.1 Performance Effects of Multitasking
The performance effects of teamwork are often analyzed in bundles or participative systems which
contain also further high performance work practices. It is mainly found to influence performance
positively (e.g., Guthrie 2001, Ichniowski and Shaw 1997, MacDuffie 1995). Some studies analyze
the single performance effects of teamwork. Banker et al. (1996) find that the formation of
4However, Hannan and Freeman (1984) see this organizational inertia in a positive light, because incumbents are
less capable to react to changing conditions outside. This leads to stable organizational structures which could
be a factor of success for innovative HRM practices.
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work teams increase quality and labor productivity over time. Decentralized teams influence
time and flexibility positively (Jayaram et al. 1999). According to Bacon and Blyton (2000),
"high road" teamworking has a positive impact on organizational performance like perceived
plant competitiveness, customer care, and product quality as well as on HR outcomes. Bailey et
al. (2001) find a positive effect of teamwork on earnings of employees in the apparel and steel
industry. Working in teams can also lead to higher growth of sales and market share (Vlachos 2008).
Few studies observe the single effect of job rotation on corporate performance. Zwick (2002) uses
the IAB establishment panel and estimates an extended Cobb-Douglas production function. Job
rotation is here seen as a form of continuous training. In order to account for a selectivity bias,
unobserved heterogeneity, and the omitted variable bias, an instrumental variables approach is
combined with a fixed effects estimation. The results indicate no effect of job rotation on firm
productivity in Germany. Chadwick (2007) examines the effects of the intensity of job rotation
on establishment performance, expressed by the natural logarithm of value added. He evaluates
data from 1212 private sector manufacturing establishments in 1997, surveyed by the U.S. Census
Bureau. The author conducts a hierarchical regression analysis by including successively quadratic
and cubed regression coefficients of the HR instruments. The results indicate a downward and
then upward inflection of the job rotation coefficient.
3.2 Timing Effects
To the best of the authors’ knowledge, a study from Cebon and Love (2002) is until now the
only one which investigates timing effects of the adoption of internal firm practices. The authors
analyze the effect of the adoption time of "Best Practices" like manufacturing-related practices
and technologies. They use data from a mail survey conducted by the Australian Manufacturing
Council and analyze 838 manufacturing sites in Australia and New Zealand with OLS. The
performance variable is an average of six dimensions where respondents are asked to evaluate
customer satisfaction, average process change over time, employee morale, productivity, cash flow,
and relative technological competitiveness each on a five-item scale. Several variables control for
further firm characteristics influencing firm performance. The results indicate that late adopters
of "Best Practices" perform poorly. This effect results primarily from the cultural incongruity late
adopters have compared to early movers.
Two recent studies analyze learning effects in firms. First, Jirjahn et al. (2011) find a dynamic
dimension of codetermination which they assign to learning effects. They analyze data from the
IfM Bonn Works Council Survey conducted by the Small and Medium Size Enterprise Research
Institute with OLS and Tobit ML. An increase of the age of the works council is associated with
a higher quality of industrial relations and better performance. The authors also find evidence
for a codetermination life cycle such that the quality of the relationship with management and
firm performance decrease after thirty years of codetermination. Second, Ben-Ner and Lluis
(2011) investigate adjustments in workplace organization structures using data from 110 publicly
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traded firms with logit and multinomial estimations. Organizational learning is divided into
learning-by-doing (experience), learning about the firms’ capabilities (changes in recent financial
performance), and social learning (distance of various sources of knowledge and observation of
other firms’ systems and performance). The authors find that learning-by-doing decreases incen-
tives to switch to more complex systems. Complex, high performance work systems have initial
positive performance effects which even out after several years. In contrast, in a less complex but
unbalanced system the performance decreases from the start and levels off after several years.
Additionally, recent performance improvements increase the likelihood that firms choose a more
complex organization structure. Lastly, there is also evidence that social learning increases the
probability to switch to a more complex system.
Evidence on timing effects in strategic management research is quite mixed. A summary already
in 1988 led to the conclusion, that acting as first-mover has both positive and negative effects. An
overall negative effect is conceivable (Lieberman and Montgomery 1988). In view of the present
paper, several conclusions can be drawn. First, market share seems to be more influenced by
timing than other performance measures due to higher costs of early adoption. Results suggest
that first entrance comes along with a larger market share (Berger and Dick 2007, Boulding and
Christen 2003, Whitten 1979) but leads not necessarily to higher profits (Boulding and Moore 1987,
Boulding and Christen 2003). Durand and Coeurderoy (2001) find no evidence for a first mover
advantage in terms of organizational performance when entering a market. In a meta-analysis
VanderWerf and Mahon (1997) figure out that market share is clearly influenced by moving first
in contrast to other performance measures.
Second, the decision to move is likely endogenous. The unconsidered heterogeneity between first
and later entrants (e.g., Boulding and Christen 2003, Lieberman and Montgomery 1988, Robinson
et al. 1992) potentially biases results. Kerin et al. (1992) state that many controllable and
uncontrollable factors have eventually an impact on firm performance. They conclude that one
has to cast doubt on the self-evident assumption that a first market entry is always positive.
For example, customer loyalty can be a source for first-mover advantages (Chen and Xie 2007).
VanderWerf and Mahon (1997) find evidence for the effect in only some industries and state that
the decision to enter a market is endogenous. Suarez and Lanzolla (2005) note that the likeliness of
a first-mover advantage depends on the pace of market and technological evolution. Dependent on
the surrounding conditions, different key resources are necessary. According to Golder and Tellis
(1993), the failure of first movers is a further potential source for biases. The unsuccessfulness of
these firms may also result from unobserved characteristics.
Third, there is evidence for a temporary nature of first-mover effects. Lee et al. (2000) find that
early and fast movers experience a gain advantage through shareholder wealth effects when entering
a market, but this advantage decreases when new product imitations are made.
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According to Suarez and Lanzolla (2005), a short-lived or durable first-mover advantage can result,
dependent on surrounding conditions.
Fourth, late-mover effects were only considered marginally in the literature. Shankar et al. (1998)
find empirical evidence for a late mover advantage. Luo and Peng (1998) detect first mover
advantages in China as a transitional economy and state that late entry is less advantageous
than early investment. First entrants with low technological capabilities have no advantages, but
instead lower survival rates compared to followers or non-entrants (Franco et al. 2009).
In summary, teamwork shows by trend a positive impact on firm performance whereas job rotation
has no or an even negative effect. The only known study investigating timing effects of the adoption
of internal firm practices finds evidence for a late adopter disadvantage. For codetermination as
well as for adjustments in workplace organization structure there is evidence for learning effects.
Empirical results in strategic management research show that one has to cast doubt on the gen-
erally assumed advantageousness of firstness: Due to higher costs of early moving predominantly
market share is effected, the endogeneity of the implementation decision influences the results, and
timing effects may be temporary. Additionally, late-mover effects are mostly neglected. These
results cannot be transfered to reorganization, but may serve as a reference point. The lack of
investigations of the timing effects of the adoption of multitasking necessitates an empirical in-
vestigation. The next chapter contains data, variables, descriptive statistics, and the econometric
modeling.
4 Data and Methodology
4.1 Data, Variables, and Descriptive Statistics
The empirical analysis is based on two nationally representative Swiss datasets from the KOF
Swiss Economic Institute (KOF) ("Organizational Change and the Adoption of Information and
Communication Technologies" [2000] and "Innovation Activities, Information Technologies, and
Work Organization" [2008]). The underlying surveys contain comprehensive questions about firm
characteristics and reorganization. The points in time of the surveys are far apart from each other,
which enables one to analyze timing effects at different stages of the development of multitasking
in Swiss firms. Both samples are based on the Business Register (BR) of the Federal Statistical
Office and include manufacturing, construction, and the commercial section of the services sector.
They are stratified with respect to sectors and sector-specific variables. For the present purpose,
the samples are restricted to firms with at least 20 employees.
Although the observations can be identified according to a firm ID in both datasets, they cannot
be merged due to two reasons: First, the surveys are not intended as panel, why the intersection of
firms that are present in both points in time is very small. Second, relatively few firms answered
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the questions related to the implementation time of teamwork and job rotation. So, the number
of firms for cross sectional estimation in one year is already relatively small. As a consequence
of these limitations, an insufficient number of firms is present in both years and the analyses of
the present paper must be restricted to cross sectional models. Panel methods or approaches that
use lagged variables do not satisfy the model requirements and would therefore lead to unreliable
results.5
As dependent variables two performance measures are used: Logs of value added as the share of
sales not belonging to purchasing (lnvaladd) reflect firm productivity. Additionally, value added is
divided by aggregate wages. Taking logs, the profitability measure lnvaladdwage results.
The surveys contain information about the implementation time of teamwork and job rotation as
key explaining variables. At first, firms specify whether there are permanent teams which handle
task areas collectively or discuss topics. After that, they are also asked to specify whether the
introduction was before 1995 (in 2008: 2000), between 1996 (2001) and 1998 (2003), or since 1998
(2003). The surveys contain the same questions for the implementation time of job rotation. Using
these information, dummy variables for first movers (team.first and jobrot.first), average movers
(team.avge and jobrot.avge), and late adopters (team.late and jobrot.late) are built. They take the
value 1 if the firm introduced teamwork and job rotation early, averagely, or lately, respectively,
0 otherwise. The reference category are firms that did not introduce teamwork and job rotation
yet. Figure 1 clarifies the time structure of these variables.
Abbildung 1: Variables indicating the adoption time of teamwork and job rotation in 2000 and
2008
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
 
2000      
First mover Average mover Late adopter         
 
2008   
First mover Average mover Late adopter 
 
Source: KOF Organization Survey 2000, KOF Innovation Survey 2008, own calculations.
To measure the performance effects, an augmented Cobb-Douglas production function is estimated.
Therefore the equations contain logs of gross investments without sales tax (lnK ), which reflects
5The authors tried to apply such models. As expected, the number of cases decreases clearly when using two
periods, which prevents to merge the datasets.
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the capital stock. In 2000 no information about investments is available. Therefore an approxima-
tion according to Arvanitis (2005) is used, where labor costs are subtracted from value added and
the result is divided by value added. Additionally, logs of the number of employees in Switzerland
including apprentices (lnL) are inserted in all equations (e.g., Arthur 1994, Brynjolfsson and Hitt
1998, Caroli and Van Reenen 2001).
The controls correspond to former studies on performance effects. First, a dummy variable which
takes the value 1 if the firm is foreign-controlled, 0 otherwise (foreign) controls for ownership (cf.
Addison and Belfield 2001). Because a high share of skilled employees is often associated with
superior firm performance (e.g., Black and Lynch 2001, Zwick 2002), the share of graduates and
employees with a degree higher than apprenticeship as a percentage of the whole employment
(highedu) is integrated. Furthermore, investments in information and communication technologies
and modern technical equipment increase productivity (e.g., Black and Lynch 2001, Zwick 2002).
For that purpose the share of total gross investments invested in information and communication
technologies (ICT) (ictshare) as well as the share of employees that use computers (compushare)
indicate the importance and development of ICT use in each firm.
Further control variables account for the influence of environmental conditions on firm perfor-
mance. Export firms, which are in international competition, tend to be more productive (Zwick
2002), why the share of exports as a percentage of sales (exportshare) is included. Generally, the
degree of competition may influence firm performance (Addison and Belfield 2001). Therefore, a
variable from the 2008 survey is taken, which evaluates the degree of price competition on the
prime market on a five-point Likert-scale (compprice).
Additionally, variables that indicate the use of high performance work practices are integrated.
The firms declare the importance of flexible working hours monthly and annually as well as
variable annual working time. These answers, each asked on a five-point Likert-scale, are added
up and standardized. They indicate the relevance of flexible working (stdflextime), which can
influence performance positively (Shephard III et al. 1996). Furthermore, a variable controls for
incentive compensation (cf. Delaney and Huselid 1996, Zheng et al. 2006). The importance of
individual, team, and firm performance for the determination of earnings are each asked on a
five-point Likert scale. The answers are added up and standardized (stdperfwage). Finally, dummy
variables for six regions (reg1 -reg6 ) and six sectors (sec1 -sec6 ) are inserted into all equations. Due
to data availability the controls differ between 2000 and 2008. Table 1 in the appendix contains
an overview of all used variables.
In the following, some descriptive statistics are provided. Tables 2 and 3 in the appendix report
means, standard errors, minima and maxima of the variables in 2000 and 2008. The final datasets
contain 925 firms in 2000 and 936 firms in 2008. Table 1 shows more detailed distributions
regarding the key explaining variables. In 2000, about 71% of the firms use teamwork; about 23%
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use job rotation. In 2008, the percentage that uses teamwork remains about the same, but the
percentage of firms that apply job rotation decreases slightly to 19.3%. This decline could be due
to the sample, but it could also indicate that the fashion of job rotation fades away. In 2000,
nearly half of all firms had already adopted multitasking. In 2008, about 70% had implemented
multitasking before 2003. A minority of firms are average or late adopters both in 2000 and
2008. Hence, the use of multitasking seems to have recrossed the peak already in Switerland. The
statistics also show that teamwork is more widely-used than job rotation.
Tabelle 1: Incidence and time of multitasking adoption
Variable 2000 % 2008 % Time variables 2000 % 2008 %
team = 1 653 70.6 657 70.2
team.first = 1 310 47.7 460 70.0
team.avge = 1 156 24.0 110 16.7
team.late = 1 187 28.3 87 13.3
jobrot = 1 212 22.9 181 19.3
jobrot.first = 1 95 44.8 122 67.4
jobrot.avge = 1 49 23.1 29 16.0
jobrot.late = 1 68 32.1 30 16.6
N 925 936
Note: Calculations are restricted to firms which do not provide item non-response for the regression analyses.
N indicates the sample size.
Source: KOF Organization Survey and KOF Innovation Survey 2008, own calculations.
Tables 2 and 3 show average characteristics of the outcome variables lnvaladd and lnvaladdwage
separately for first movers, average movers and late adopters compared to non-users in 2000 and
2008. At a first glance, that data show several tendencies: First, in 2000 the outcome variables show
generally higher values for users of teamwork compared to non-users, whatever implementation
time is regarded. This suggests a performance-enhancing effect of teamwork in 2000. By contrast,
first movers and average adopters of job rotation are better but late adopters are worse off than
non-users. Second, in 2008 users of teamwork and job rotation always perform better than non-
adopters (except profitability of teamwork use, which is equal for non-users and late adopters).
These observations call for further investigations, where other firm characteristics are accounted
for.
4.2 Performance Effects of the Incidence of Multitasking
To begin with, generally the performance effects of multitasking are estimated using an augmented
Cobb-Douglas production function, following earlier studies (e.g., Black and Lynch 2001, Zwick
2002). Additionally to the input factors capital and labor controls that also have an impact on firm
performance are included (in 2000: foreign, highedu, ictinvest, compushare, exportshare, stdflextime,
stdperfwage; in 2008: foreign, highedu, ictinvest, compushare, exportshare, compprice, stdflextime;
reg1 -reg6 and sec1 -sec6 ). The Cobb-Douglas function is additionally augmented by two dummy
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Tabelle 2: Comparison of means for the outcome variables in 2000
Variables team = 0 team.first = 1 team.avge = 1 team.late = 1
lnvaladd 16.02 16.71 16.53 16.43
lnvaladdwage 0.54 0.60 0.58 0.59
Variable jobrot = 0 jobrot.first = 1 jobrot.avge = 1 jobrot.late = 1
lnvaladd 16.38 16.47 16.99 16.37
lnvaladdwage 0.57 0.61 0.64 0.55
Note: Calculations are restricted to firms which do not provide item non-response for the regression analyses.
The sample size is N = 925.
Source: KOF Organization Survey 2000, own calculations.
Tabelle 3: Comparison of means for the outcome variables in 2008
Variable team = 0 team.first = 1 team.avge = 1 team.late = 1
lnvaladd 16.23 16.97 16.63 16.38
lnvaladdwage 0.53 0.56 0.63 0.53
Variable jobrot = 0 jobrot.first = 1 jobrot.avge = 1 jobrot.late = 1
lnvaladd 16.64 16.79 16.68 16.70
lnvaladdwage 0.55 0.57 0.70 0.60
Note: Calculations are restricted to firms which do not provide item non-response for the regression analyses.
The sample size is N = 936.
Source: KOF Innovation Survey 2008, own calculations.
variables which take the value 1 if the firm uses teamwork and job rotation, respectively, 0 otherwise
(team and jobrot). This yields the following equation for firms i=1,. . . , N :
lnYi = β0 + β1lnKi + β2lnLi + β3teami + β4jobroti + x′iδ + ui, (1)
where lnYi is the outcome of interest for firm i. x is a vector of controls. team and jobrot indicate
whether teamwork and job rotation are used in firm i. The β and δ are the regression coefficients
to be estimated, where β3 and β4 are the key parameters of interest. They measure the association
of the existence of multitasking with firm performance. The error term u is assumed to be IID
with an expected value of zero and variance σ2.
4.3 Performance Effects of the Adoption Time
4.3.1 OLS Estimation
The estimation strategy for the timing effects proceeds in three steps. First, a production function
is augmented by dummy variables which indicate whether the firm is an early mover (team.first
and jobrot.first), an average mover (team.avge and jobrot.avge), or a late adopter (team.late and
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jobrot.late). The reference category refers to firms, which did not introduce multitasking yet. This
yields the following OLS regression model for teamwork:
lnYi = β0 + β1lnKi + β2lnLi + β3team.firsti + β4team.avgei + β5team.latei + x′iδ + ui. (2)
The x is a vector which contains the same controls as in equation (1). The β and δ are the parame-
ters to be estimated. β3, β4, and β5 are the key parameters of interest indicating the relationship
between the implementation time of multitasking and firm performance. The equation for job
rotation is analogous to equation (2).
In equation (2), β3, β4, and β5 are likely to be biased effects on firm performance due to endogeneity
of the implementation choice.6 Firms potentially self-select towards the adoption of multitasking
dependent on observed and unobserved firm characteristics. In the case that these characteristics
simultaneously effect firm performance and the implementation choice, the time variables are no
more exogenous, potentially leading to biased results. For example, very successful, high-quality
managers could increase firm performance and also have a tendency to introduce advanced work
organization practices earlier than others. In this case, a significant positive coefficient of β3 would
possibly overestimate the effect of early implementation on performance. However, it could also
be that less successful managers reorganize early because they see an opportunity to improve. In
that case, the estimates would underestimate the true effect of early implementation. The same
applies for late adoption: Managers that are in general less innovative and therefore less successful,
could introduce multitasking later, leading to a negative bias. Yet, firms that adopt a high quality
strategy successfully potentially wait with reorganization in order to ensure high quality, which
would bias the effect of late adoption upward. The above mentioned examples show that the choice
and time of adoption is likely endogenous. One can think of diverse and opposite effects, so that
the resulting potential bias cannot be predicted.
4.3.2 Endogeneity Correction for Self Selection towards the Adoption Time
In the second step, this selectivity bias is addressed using an endogeneity correction introduced
by Dubin and McFadden (1984). The two-stage procedure works in the following way: In a
first step the probability of being a first or an average mover, a late adopter, or no adopter is
estimated. Using these estimates the endogeneity in the productivity estimation is considered.
For this purpose a new categorical variable is built (time) which takes the value 1 if team.first =
1, a value of 2 if team.average = 1, a value of 3 if team.late = 1 and 0, if the firm has not yet
introduced teamworking or job rotation, respectively.
6In the case of a market entry, the present resources and capabilities a firm already has influence whether and
when the firm introduces products. Here, the relative skills are of vital importance. When a firm is relatively
capable in product innovation it will enter earlier than a firm which has a comparative advantage in marketing
or manufacturing and which waits until the difficulties with technology or market are dealt with (e.g., Lieberman
and Montgomery 1988, Moore et al. 1991, Robinson et al. 1992, Thomas 1995, Thomas 1996).
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Due to the nature of the resulting time variable, a mulitnomial logit model can be estimated
(Cameron and Trivedi 2005, Greene 2008), where
Prob[timei = j|zi] = exp(z
′
iαj)∑3
j=0 exp(z′iαj)
, j = 0, . . . , 3. (3)
The variable timei is the multinomial dependent variable which takes the values 0 to 3, and the α
are the parameters to be estimated. Furthermore, z is a vector of the observable variables which
are assumed to explain the firm decision concerning the time of the implementation of teamwork
and job rotation. This vector z = [x τ ] includes all explaining variables x used in equation (2) as
well as an identification variable τ . This variable is used as an exclusion restriction in order to
not only draw upon the functional form for identification. It shall be significantly correlated with
the classification of the firms concerning the introduction of teamwork and job rotation, but shall
not directly influence the outcome variables (Beckmann et al. 2009, Origo and Pagani 2009). In
order to identify the multinomial logit model (3), one of the four possible outcomes serves as the
reference category, so that this equation is not estimated.
Using the predicted probabilities P̂ gained from the multinomial logit one correction term similar
to inverse Mills ratios for each endogenous variable can be computed (Beckmann et al. 2009, Origo
and Pagani 2009):
cj = E(/timei = j) =
3∑
j 6=l
(
P̂llnP̂l
1− P̂l
+ lnP̂j
)
. (4)
Here P̂l is the predicted probability of the l-th choice from the first stage multinomial logit model
(Beckmann et al. 2009).  is the error term of equation (3). The three correction terms for first
movers, average movers, and late adopters are inserted into the production function in equation
(2), which then becomes:
lnYi = β0 +β1lnKi +β2lnLi +β3team.firsti +β4team.avgei +β5team.latei +x′iδ+ c′jλ+ui. (5)
The reference category are firms that do not use multitasking. The β do not have to be significant
to show timing effects. Even when the coefficients differ significantly from each other, this indicates
that the timing variables have different effects. The correction terms shall control for the possible
correlation of the unobservable firm characteristics and performance. If the estimated λ are not
statistically significant in equation (5), endogeneity due to time-varying unobserved factors is not
a big problem in the present case and the estimation of the linear OLS model leads to unbiased
results. However, if the correction terms are significant, endogeneity is a serious problem and
the insertion of the correction terms leads to unbiased estimates of the parameters of interest
(Beckmann et al. 2009, Origo and Pagani 2009).
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4.3.3 Endogeneity Correction for Self Selection Towards Multitasking Use
The endogeneity correction above considers the self selection towards the adoption time. It
also determines the performance effects compared to non-users of multitasking. However, firms
potentially also self-select generally towards the use of multitasking instruments. Sample selection
of the general choice to use or not use multitasking could also bias the true impact of the time of
introduction. An estimation approach accounting for this type of self selection is an endogenous
switching regression model. In this model, different production functions for firms with and
without multitasking are estimated, such that the reference group changes (Alene and Manyong
2007, Maddala 1983).
In this model in the first stage the choice of a multitasking adoption is determined using a probit
model due to the dichotomous decision to apply multitasking. The firms introduce multitasking
only if they assume that the difference between the marginal net benefit of introducing multitask-
ing compared to not introducing is positive. Multitasking is adopted if this difference m∗  0.
However, the true difference m∗ is not observed (Alene and Manyong 2007).
What can be seen instead is the observed adoption decision of the firms with respect to the other
observed firm characteristics m. Therefore
m∗ = z′υ + c
m = 1 if m∗ > 0, (6)
m = 0 if m∗ ≤ 0,
where z is a vector of firm characteristics, which contains the same control variables as the previous
estimations (firm characteristics and an exclusion restriction). υ is a vector of the parameters to
be estimated and c is a random error term which is expected to have mean zero and variance σ2c
(Alene and Manyong 2007).
As mentioned above, the endogenous switching regression model uses separate production functions
for firms with and without multitasking:
lnYm = x′mβm + m if m = 1, (7)
lnYs = x′sβs + s if m = 0.
lnYm is productivity of multitasking firms and lnYs is productivity of firms that do not adopt
multitasking (singletasking firms). Because only lnYm and lnYs are actually observed, the OLS es-
timates might be biased if the error terms of equation (7) have non-zero expected values conditional
on the sample selection criterion (Lee 1978, Maddala 1983).
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Furthermore, it is assumed that the error terms c, m, and s are jointly normal distributed.
Under the assumption that σ2c = 1 the vector z can be clearly defined (Wolf and Zwick 2002).
Based on these assumptions, the expected values of the truncated error terms (m|m = 1) and
(s|m = 0) can be computed (Alene and Manyong 2007, Wolf und Zwick 2002):
E(m|m = 1) = E(m| > z′υ) = σmc
(
− φ(z
′υ)
Φ(z′υ)
)
≡ σmcλm, (8)
E(s|m = 0) = E(s| ≤ z′υ) = σsc
(
φ(z′υ)
1− Φ(z′υ)
)
≡ σscλs. (9)
In equations (8) and (9) φ and Φ are the probability density and cumulative distribution functions
of the standard normal distribution; σmc is the covariance of m and c; and σsc is the covariance
of s and c. The λ are the inverse Mills ratios (Alene and Manyong 2007).
Estimating in a first stage a probit model of the criterion equation (6) and in the second stage
the regression equations (7) leads to heteroscedastic residuals (Maddala 1983). In order to gain
efficient estimates, a full information maximum likelihood (FIML) method proposed by Lokshin
and Sajaia (2004) is applied. It simultaneously estimates the selection and the regression equations
and therefore yields consistent standard errors (Alene and Manyong 2007). The estimation is
carried out by the movestay command in STATA (Lokshin and Sajaia 2004).7
The inverse Mills ratios can now be inserted in a performance equation which contains only firms
that use multitasking. Early and late adoption are the key explaining variables and average moving
is the reference group:
lnYmi = β0 + β1lnKi + β2lnLi + β3team.firstmi + β4team.latemi + x′miδ + σmcλmi + umi. (10)
The m indicates that only adopters of multitasking are in the equation. λmi is the inverse Mills
ratio for users of multitasking. A significant coefficient of λmi would indicate that endogeneity due
to the self selection towards multitasking use is a serious problem in the present case.
5 Empirical Results
This section contains the empirical results. To start with, the results of the performance estimation
of the existence of multitasking are shown. Continuing to the main research question of the paper,
the separate effects of first and average movers and of late adopters are investigated using OLS
estimations as well as two approaches to account for endogeneity. Each analysis is carried out
using a productivity (lnvaladd) and a profitability measure (lnvaladdwage) as dependent variables.
7The movestay command to estimate the full information maximum likelihood model is used e.g., in the studies
from Alene and Manyong (2007), Lokshin and Beegle (2006), Ohnemus (2007), and Wahlberg (2008).
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5.1 Performance Effects of the Incidence of Multitasking
The performance effects of the presence of multitasking are estimated with a usual OLS regression.
This allows one to get a first impression of the general impact of teamwork and job rotation. Table
4 contains the performance effects of the incidence of teamwork and job rotation. The coefficient
for the use of teamwork is not significant in any of the models. In contrast, job rotation shows a
significant positive effect on profitability in 2008. There is no productivity effect of job rotation.
Tabelle 4: Performance estimates for the incidence of teamwork and job rotation
Estimation method: OLS
2000 2008
Dependent variable Value added Profitability Value added Profitability
C1 C2 C3 C4
team 0.019 0.008 -0.001 0.014
(0.029) (0.019) (0.035) (0.026)
jobrot -0.022 -0.009 0.074 0.055∗
(0.027) (0.019) (0.049) (0.030)
lnK 0.312∗∗∗ 0.317∗∗ 0.083∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗
(0.090) (0.126) (0.019) (0.012)
lnL 1.019∗∗∗ 0.005 0.899∗∗∗ -0.042∗∗
(0.014) (0.010) (0.023) (0.019)
Controls
foreign 0.064 0.025 0.220∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.028) (0.046) (0.035)
highedu 0.005∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
ictinvest -0.036∗∗ -0.035∗∗ 0.001 -0.001
(0.015) (0.014) (0.001) (0.001)
compushare 0.088∗∗∗ 0.012 0.064∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.011) (0.016) (0.011)
exportshare 0.001 0.000 0.001∗∗ 0.001∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
compprice -0.003 0.004
(0.015) (0.012)
stdflextime -0.012 -0.008
(0.012) (0.009)
stdperfwage 0.016 0.013 -0.040∗ -0.012
(0.015) (0.012) (0.023) (0.014)
Regions & sectors yes yes yes yes
F test 336.32∗∗∗ 11.80∗∗∗ 284.76∗∗∗ 6.36∗∗∗
R2 0.907 0.294 0.840 0.154
N 925 936
Note: ***/**/* indicates significance at the 1/5/10%-level. The values in parentheses represent the robust
standard errors of the coefficients. N indicates the sample size.
Source: KOF Organization Survey 2000 and KOF Innovation Survey 2008, own calculations.
Capital is significantly positive in all equations. Additionally, foreign ownership and the ex-
portshare are significant positive in 2008. The share of highly educated employees and the share
of employees that use computers partly have also significant positive impact. Most variables that
have significant impact on productivity have a clearly lower, no, or an even negative effect on
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profitability. This finding is obvious, since the profitability measure includes negative wage effects.
For example, it seems rational that a larger share of well educated employees is accompanied by
a higher wage level in a firm. Moreover, ICT investments show a significant negative effect in
2000 on both performance measures. At that time, ICT potentially generated higher costs but
caused little benefits. Surprisingly, the indicator for performance pay has a negative impact on
productivity in 2008. This might possibly be seen as an indication for the motivation crowding
out (e.g., Frey and Jegen 2001).
The results for the incidence of teamwork contradict most previous studies which find mainly
positive effects on firm performance (e.g., Banker et al. 1996, Vlachos 2008). The result for job
rotation is in line with Zwick (2002) who finds no effect of job rotation on value added. In contrast,
Chadwick (2007) examines no respectively a negative effect of job rotation on value added minus
labor costs. The next section considers the effects of the adoption time of team work and job
rotation.
5.2 Performance Effects of the Adoption Time
In the following part, the effects of the adoption time are analyzed. After estimating OLS, in the
second stage the endogeneity correction according to Dubin and McFadden (1984) is applied. In a
third step, an endogenous switching regression model is estimated. Tables 4 to 6 in the appendix
contain the complete regression results for OLS, the approach of Dubin and McFadden (1984), and
the endogenous switching regression model exemplarily for profitability and job rotation in 2008.
Also the multinomial logit estimates for the correction according to Dubin and McFadden (1984)
and the full information maximum likelihood estimates for the endogenous switching regression
model are shown there.8
In the present case, it is difficult to find an adequate exclusion restriction for the endogeneity
correction methods. Since the likelihood function using the full information maximum likelihood
model does not converge if relying on identification through nonlinearities, however, it is necessary
to find an identifying variable. A closer examination of the data shows that teamwork and job
rotation are highly correlated with each other. Estimating the determinants of teamwork and
job rotation, the respective other multitasking instrument is always significant on the 1%-level.
This is not surprising since firms often use bundles of high performance work practices, which
also include teamwork and job rotation (cf. e.g., MacDuffie 1995). Therefore, the respective other
multitasking instrument is used to identify the other one. Since, in the case of no valid exclusion
restriction, the models shall be identified by non-linearities (cf. Lokshin and Sajaia 2004, Origo
and Pagani 2009), the choice of the identifying instrument is not seen as essential for the analyses.
8The other complete regression equations are similar and therefore not shown here. They are available from the
authors upon request.
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Teamwork and job rotation are successful in identifying the respective other multitasking in-
strument. Applying the endogeneity correction according to Dubin and McFadden (1984), the
exclusion restrictions are highly significant in all multinomial logit estimations.9 When estimating
the full information maximum likelihood model teamwork and job rotation work well too as
identifying instruments and are mainly significant.10
Tables 5 and 6 include the results where one of the performance measures lnvaladd or lnvaladdwage
is regressed on the adoption time of teamwork and job rotation, respectively. The first column
contains OLS estimates, the second and third ones contain estimates that correct for endogeneity.
The regressions include the controls that were presented above.
As Table 5 shows, the late implementation of teamwork does have a significant negative effect on
value added in 2008 applying the approach according to Dubin and McFadden (1984). Further-
more, using the endogenous switching regression model, first and late adoption are harmful for
profitability in 2008. Additonally, in 2008 the coefficients of first and late adoption of teamwork
for the determination of value added are significantly different from each other applying OLS and
the method proposed by Dubin and McFadden (1984) (see columns C11 and C12 at the bottom).
Since first implementation of teamwork has a positive and late implementation has a negative
sign, moving first has a rather positive and moving late has a rather negative effect on value added.
Table 6 contains the effects of the implementation time of job rotation. In 2000, late implementation
of job rotation influences profitability negatively when estimating OLS, the approach according to
Dubin and McFadden (1984) and the endogenous switching regression model (see columns C20 to
C22). Additionally, the coefficients of average and late, first and late (OLS) and first and late (D-
McF) adoption of job rotation are significantly different from each other. In 2008, average adoption
of job rotation has a significant positive effect on productivity and profitability when estimating
OLS (see columns C23 and C26). When applying the method proposed by Dubin and McFadden
(1984) this variable is only significant when determining profitability. Additionally, the differences
between the positive coefficients for average and the negative coefficient for late implementation
of job rotation for productivity are significant when estimating OLS and the method proposed by
Dubin and McFadden (1984).
9The test statistic for the exclusion restriction jobrot is in C6 and C9: χ2(3) = 13.60, p-value=.004; and in C12 and
C15: χ2(3) = 21.37, p-value=.000. The test statistic for the exclusion restriction team is in C18 and C21: χ
2
(3) =
11.24, p-value=.011; and in C24 and C27: χ2(3) = 18.34, p-value=.000.
10Job rotation is significant in C7 with p-value=.023 and in C13 and C16 with p-value=.000. The variable is
not significant in C10 with p-value=.270. Teamwork is significant in C19 with p-value=.023 and in C25 with
p-value=.000. The variable is not significant in C22 with p-value=.417 and in C28 with p-value=.830
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When restricting the analysis to firms that already use job rotation and accounting for endogeneity
towards the use of job rotation, early and late adoption are highly significant negative compared
to average adoption (see columns C25 and C28).
Finally, the importance of endogeneity in the empirical analyses is examined. All in all, there is
mixed evidence for the existence of endogeneity in the present case. Applying the endogeneity
correction introduced by Dubin and McFadden (1984), none of the correction terms are jointly
significant. In case of the endogenous switching regression model, the Wald test of independent
equations in the full maximum likelihood estimates indicates whether the decision to adopt
teamwork and job rotation is endogenous. Accordingly, there is evidence for a selection bias
in C7 (χ2(3) = 106.50, p-value=.000) and C19 (χ2(3) = 122.08, p-value=.000). Additionally, the
inverse Mills ratios in the separate production functions in C7, C10, C13, and C22 are statistically
significant. In 2000, for teamwork with productivity and profitability as well as for job rotation
with profitability these inverse Mills ratios are significant positive, which indicates, that rather
firms that perform worse choose multitasking. In contrast, the inverse Mills ratio in the equation
for teamwork and productivity is significant negative in 2008. In that case, firms that already
perform well more likely choose teamwork.
According to the indication of endogeneity in the case of the endogenous switching regression
model, C7, C10, C13, C19, and C22 are the preferred estimations. In the case that no endogeneity
is indicated, OLS is the preferred specification. This is the case in C14, C23, and C26. Potentially
there is relatively few evidence for endogeneity because the multitasking variables are lagged and
therefore relatively far away in the past. Possibly OLS is a suitable estimation method in the
present case.
Since the results using the full information maximum likelihood method have a different reference
group than results gained with OLS and the approach according to Dubin and McFadden (1984)
(average adopters versus no adopters), additionally OLS regressions are estimated that contain
only firms that use multitasking. Now the reference category are average adopters. The results
are summarized in Table 7.11
In 2000, only the coefficient for late adoption of job rotation on profitability is significant negative.
In 2008, the coefficients between first and late adoption of teamwork determining productivity differ
from each other. Furthermore, late adopters of teamwork perform worse in terms of profitability.
Additionally, first and late adopters of job rotation have significant negative effects on productivity
and profitability. These results are equivalent to the estimates gained with the full information
maximum likelihood model.
11The complete results are available from the authors upon request.
24
Thus, there is some evidence for the importance of endogeneity due to self selection towards
multitasking use, but it does not lead to strongly differing results compared to OLS.
Tabelle 7: Time effects restricted to firms that use teamwork and job rotation
2000 2008
Estimation method OLS OLS
Value added team.first n.s. n.s.
a
team.late n.s. n.s.
Profitability team.first n.s. n.s.team.late n.s. neg.∗∗
Value added jobrot.first n.s. neg.
∗
jobrot.late n.s. neg.∗
Profitability jobrot.first n.s. neg.
∗∗
jobrot.late neg.∗∗ neg.∗
Note: ***/**/* indicates significance at the 1/5/10%-level. The standard errors are robust. n.s. indicates that
the coefficient is not significant. neg. indicates that the coefficient is negative and significant.
a Difference between team.first and team.late is significant with p-value = .094.
Source: KOF Organization Survey and KOF Innovation Survey 2008, own calculations.
Taking into account the indicators for endogeneity, the results in Tables 5, 6, and 7 can be
summarized as follows: The implementation time of teamwork does not have significant impact on
firm performance in 2000. In 2008, however, first adopters perform rather good and late adopters
perform rather bad with regard to productivity. Additionally, the profitability differs between
average and late adopters of teamwork. Thus, first and average movers experience a comparative
advantage and late movers perform slightly worse due to quantity effects. In 2008, teamwork is
already well-established in Swiss firms and new users have disadvantages. It seems that quantity
is crucial for a beneficial adoption of teamwork.
In contrast, the implementation time of job rotation has noticeable effects on firm performance.
In 2000, late adoption influences profitability negatively. It yields ceteris paribus a negative
profitability differential of -6.3% and -4.6%, respectively. This indicates that job rotation comes
along with higher wages in 2000. In 2008, average adoption is beneficial compared to all firms. It
leads to a positive differential of 17.2% for productivity and 13.1% for profitability. Restricting the
analysis to firms that use job rotation, early as well as late adoption of job rotation is harmful for
firms. Early and late adoption involve ceteris paribus negative productivity differentials of 21.1%
and 25.2%; profitability is decreased by 13.6% and 15.9%.12 From this it follows that both quality
and quantity effects apply when adopting job rotation. Finally, the use of job rotation includes
higher wages and late adoption is worse.
12The performance effects stem from the OLS regression restricted to users of job rotation in 2008 in Table 7.
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The performance effects of job rotation are unusually high. As Table 1 shows, relatively few firms
use job rotation. For example, in 2008 only 29 firms are average movers and 30 are late adopters.
Thus, there is possibly not enough variation in the data to ensure reliable results. Therefore, one
has to cast doubt on these unexpected high performance effects of job rotation.
Three robustness checks are performed. First, the analyses are repeated taking the importance of
individual, team, and firm performance for the determination of earnings as exclusion restriction
for the endogeneity correction methods. The results are qualitatively the same, with the exception
that teamwork shows significant first-mover advantages regarding productivity in 2000. The
descriptive statistics support this finding (see Table 2). Therefore, it is assumed that the results of
the present paper are a rather cautious estimate of the effects of teamwork adoption. Furthermore,
logs of sales and logs of (sales over wages) are taken as additional performance measures. Some
of the standard errors are higher, but the results do not differ significantly. Thus, the findings
of the present paper do not crucially depend on the choice of the exclusion restriction and the
performance measures.
According to the results, there seems to be a late adopter disadvantage as Cebon and Love (2002)
find for Best Practices. Furthermore, the positive effect of average and the negative one of late
implementation of job rotation in 2008 suggest the evidence of life cycles which is in line with
the findings of Jirjahn et al. (2011) and Ben-Ner and Lluis (2011). Ben-Ner and Lluis (2011)
also found initial positive effects of complex high performance work practices which even out over
time. This finding is to some extent confirmed by the fact that job rotation is a rather complex
HR instrument and shows the clearest negative impact of late adoption.
Limitations of the study partly arise from the data characteristics. All in all, the number of
observations is relatively small, especially when it comes to the estimation of separate production
functions. Single firms could then largely drive the results. Furthermore, the data do not provide
information about whether the multitasking instruments were only implemented in some areas
or all over the firm. A further drawback is the relatively late determination of timing effects in
2000 and 2008, since reorganization towards holistic job design is under way for several decades.
Analyzing timing effects further ago would make sense, but is, however, not possible due to lack
of data. Additionally, due to the data structure the findings mainly show temporary effects,
especially when observing average and late adoption. The data only allow drawing conclusions
regarding short term effects, because average and late adoption were at most five and two years
ago, respectively. Long term effects could be analyzed when combining information about adoption
in 2000 with performance in 2008, which is not possible due to few overlapping of the datasets. It
is, however, questionable whether the implementation of multitasking leads to performance effects
that are determinable after years or even decades. Finally, one could argue, that reverse causality is
a further source of endogeneity in the data. This is, however, rather unlikely, because the questions
regarding the adoption time are related to earlier points in time and therefore include a time lag.
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6 Conclusion
The present paper investigates the performance effects of the timing of the adoption of multi-
tasking using nationally representative Swiss corporate data from 2000 and 2008. Particularly
it is analyzed whether the quantity or the quality effects are stronger when a firm implements
teamwork and job rotation. Information about the time of the adoption of teamwork and job
rotation enable classifying firms as early or average movers or late adopters of multitasking,
respectively. To account for potential endogeneity due to the self-selection of firms two separate
two-step estimation strategies are applied. The results suggest that there is endogeneity due to
the general self selection of firms towards multitasking use.
The results can be summarized as follows: Teamwork shows a slightly positive first-mover and
negative late-adopter effect both on productivity and profitability. An explanation for the only
small effects might be that teamwork is so well-established in firms that it does not generate
significant comparative advantages anymore. This is supported by the fact, that in 2000 already
about 70% of all asked Swiss firms used teamwork.
In contrast, in 2000 late implementation of job rotation influences profitability negatively, but
has no significant effect on productivity. This indicates, that the use of job rotation involves
higher wages. In the year 2008, average implementation of job rotation is beneficial both in terms
of productivity and profitability. When considering only users of job rotation, early and late
introduction of job rotation is harmful for firms. Thus, both quantity and quality effects appear
when implementing job rotation.
In general, the clearest evidence is found when observing only users of multitasking. In that case,
late and partly also early adoption is harmful compared to average adoption. All other effects are
rather small. According to that, less the general decision to implement multitasking and more the
implementation time is important.
Possibly, the effects of teamwork and job rotation differ due to its varying complexity: The
adoption of teamwork is rather easy, why an early implementation is favorable and a quantity
effect applies. Contrary, job rotation is less widely used and its implementation is more complex
why quantity as well as quality effects play a role. All in all, there seems to be a life cycle for the
performance effects of the implementation of teamwork as well as for job rotation due to learning
effects.
The data do not allow investigating potential complementarities between teamwork and job ro-
tation due to a small number of cases. Furthermore, the results reflect only short-term effects of
multitasking adoption.
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It would be interesting to see if first-mover and late-adopter firms experience performance effects
in the long run.
Overall, the results of the present paper show that firms indeed may benefit or suffer from the chosen
time of multitasking adoption. Dependent on complexity and establishment of the instrument,
mainly quantity or quality of the adoption or both influence corporate performance. Late adoption
of multitasking instruments tends to have negative effects on firm performance. Firms should
therefore analyze potential HR instruments and choose the corresponding adoption time. All in
all, this confirms the previous academic literature, which also does not find a consistent first mover
or late adopter effect.
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Appendix
Tabelle 1: Description of the variables
Variable Description
Incidence and implementation time of multitasking
Teamwork (team) Dummy variable indicating whether or not a firm uses
teamwork
Job rotation (jobrot) Dummy variable indicating whether or not a firm uses
job rotation
First mover (team.first/jobrot.first) Dummy variable indicating whether or not a firm
introduced teamwork/job rotation before 1995/2003
Average mover (team.avge/jobrot.avge) Dummy variable indicating whether or not a firm
introduced teamwork/job rotation between 1995/2003
and 1997/2005
Late adopter (team.late/jobrot.late) Dummy variable indicating whether or not a firm
introduced teamwork/job rotation between 1998/2006
and 2000/2008
Outcome variables
Productivity (lnvaladd) Logs of value added in 1999/2007
Profitability (lnvaladdwage) Logs of (value added over wages) in 1999/2007
Firm characteristics and environment
Log capital (lnK) Natural logarithm of a firm’s gross investments in 2007
in 2008 and (Value added - labor costs)/value added in
2000
Log labor (lnL) Natural logarithm of a firm’s number of employees in
1998/2007
Foreign-controlled (foreign) Dummy variable indicating whether or not a firm is
foreign-controlled
Highly educated employees (highedu) Share of employees who have an education higher than
apprenticeship or are graduates
ICT investments (ictinvest) Variable indicating investments in ICT as share of total
sales 1998−2000/2006−2008
Computer use (compushare) Variable indicating the share of computers users
Exportshare (exportshare) Share of exports on sales in 1999/2007
Competition (compprice) Variable indicating the degree of price competition on
the prime marketa
Importance of flexible working hours (stdflextime) Variable indicating the importance of flexible working
hoursb
Importance of performance for wage determination Dummy variable indicating the importance of individual,
(stdperfwage) team, and firm performance for wage dedetermination
Regional dummies (reg1 -reg7 ) Seven dummies indicating the regional affiliation of the
firm
Sector dummies (sec1 -sec7 ) Seven dummies indicating the sector affiliation of the
firm
Note: a Variable only used in 2008. b Variable only used in 2000.
Source: KOF Organization Survey and KOF Innovation Survey 2008, own calculations.
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Tabelle 2: Descriptive statistics in 2000
Variable Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
lnvaladd 16.42 1.22 13.77 2.10
lnvaladdwage 0.58 0.40 0.00 3.42
team 0.71 0.45 0 1
team.first 0.33 0.47 0 1
team.avge 0.17 0.38 0 1
team.late 0.20 0.40 0 1
jobrot 0.23 0.42 0 1
jobrot.first 0.10 0.30 0 1
jobrot.avge 0.05 0.22 0 1
jobrot.late 0.07 0.25 0 1
lnK -1.04 0.77 -16.61 -0.03
lnL 4.59 1.04 3.00 10.68
foreign 0.15 0.36 0 1
highedu 16.56 16.50 0.00 100
ictinvest 1.93 1.10 0 5
compushare 2.64 1.41 0 5
exportshare 23.86 33.84 0.00 100
stdflextime 0.00 1.00 -1.40 2.28
stdperfwage 0.00 1.00 -3.22 1.95
Note: Calculations are restricted to firms which do not provide item non-response for the regression
analyses. The sample size is N = 925.
Source: KOF Organization Survey 2000, own calculations.
Tabelle 3: Descriptive statistics in 2008
Variable Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
lnvaladd 16.66 1.33 11.42 22.76
lnvaladdwage 0.56 0.39 0.00 4.01
team 0.70 0.46 0 1
team.first 0.49 0.50 0 1
team.avge 0.12 0.32 0 1
team.late 0.09 0.29 0 1
jobrot 0.19 0.40 0 1
jobrot.first 0.13 0.33 0 1
jobrot.avge 0.03 0.17 0 1
jobrot.late 0.03 0.17 0 1
lnK 13.74 1.81 3.22 20.28
lnL 4.72 1.14 3.04 10.55
foreign 0.20 0.40 0 1
highedu 21.63 18.84 0.00 100
ictinvest 19.12 21.83 0.00 100
compushare 3.04 1.50 0 5
exportshare 26.76 35.24 0.00 100
compprice 3.90 0.98 1 5
stdperfwage 0.00 1.00 -3.25 1.96
Note: Calculations are restricted to firms which do not provide item non-response for the regression
analyses. The sample size is N = 936.
Source: KOF Innovation Survey 2008, own calculations.
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Tabelle 4: Complete estimates for profitability and job rotation (2008)
Dependent variable: lnvaladdwage
Estimation method OLS D-McF ESRM
jobrot.first 0.034 0.030 -0.151∗∗
(0.034) (0.035) (0.067)
jobrot.avge 0.131∗∗ 0.125∗
(0.067) (0.066)
jobrot.late 0.053 0.038 -0.182∗∗
(0.069) (0.068) (0.085)
lnK 0.042∗∗∗ -0.014 -0.196
(0.012) (0.061) (0.166)
lnL -0.042∗∗ -0.037 0.169
(0.019) (0.069) (0.142)
foreign 0.102∗∗∗ -0.612 0.446
(0.036) (0.708) (0.306)
highedu -0.001 0.030 0.002
(0.001) (0.023) (0.004)
ictinvest -0.001 -0.031 -0.007∗∗
(0.001) (0.024) (0.004)
compushare 0.034 ∗∗∗ 0.199 0.266
(0.011) (0.152) (0.175)
exportshare 0.001∗∗ -0.001 0.005∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.002) (0.002)
compprice 0.004 0.110 0.046
(0.012) (0.077) (0.047)
stdperfwage -0.011 0.335 -0.242
(0.014) (0.257) (0.172)
constant 0.146 8.403 5.472
(0.133) (10.432) (3.531)
Regions and sectors yes yes yes
Correction terms
E(/Time = first) -0.287
0.232
E(/Time = avge -0.179∗
0.098
E(/Time = late) 0.364
0.292
Inverse Mills ratio -3.006
(2.053)
F test/Wald test 6.12∗∗∗ 5.57∗∗∗ 2.85∗∗∗
R2 0.155 0.159 0.364
N 936 936 181
Note: ***/**/* indicates significance at the 1/5/10%-level. The values in parentheses represent the robust
standard errors of the coefficients. N indicates the sample size. The coefficients of the sector and regional dummies
are available from the authors upon request.
Source: KOF Innovation Survey 2008, own calculations.
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Tabelle 5: Multinomial logit estimates for profitability and job rotation (2008)
Time of implementation (reference group: no job rotation)
jobrot.first jobrot.avge jobrot.late
team 1.237∗∗∗ 0.168 1.041∗
(0.310) (0.490) (0.614)
lnK 0.139 0.106 0.205
(0.109) (0.175) (0.156)
lnL -0.085 -0.274 -0.200
(0.171) (0.305) (0.217)
foreign -0.592∗∗ 0.632∗ 0.474
(0.297) (0.375) (0.489)
highedu 0.003 0.006 -0.021
(0.007) (0.012) (0.014)
ictinvest -0.007 0.001 0.021∗∗
(0.007) (0.013) (0.009)
compushare -0.035 -0.108 -0.224
(0.097) (0.187) (0.150)
exportshare -0.002 0.003 0.002
(0.004) (0.006) (0.007)
compprice 0.056 0.065 -0.021
(0.112) (0.230) (0.207)
stdperfwage 0.280∗∗ 0.170 -0.013
(0.113) (0.208) (0.220)
constant -3.737∗∗∗ -17.471∗∗∗ -19.125∗∗∗
(1.376) (1.880) (2.083)
Regions and sectors yes yes yes
Pseudo R2 0.103
N 936
Note: ***/**/* indicates significance at the 1/5/10%-level. The values in parentheses represent the robust
standard errors of the coefficients. N indicates the sample size. The coefficients of the sector and regional dummies
are available from the authors upon request.
Source: KOF Innovation Survey 2008, own calculations.
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Tabelle 6: Full information maximum likelihood estimation of the endogenous switching regres-
sion model for profitability and job rotation (2008)
Time of implementation (reference group: no job rotation)
lnvaladdwage
without job rotation with job rotation selection
team 0.022
0.100
lnK 0.027∗ 0.042∗∗ 0.104∗∗
(0.015) (0.019) (0.046)
lnL -0.048∗∗ -0.022 -0.081
(0.023) (0.032) (0.064)
foreign 0.124∗∗∗ 0.021 -0.193
(0.043) (0.079) (0.132)
highedu -0.001 -0.003 -0.002
(0.001) (0.002) (0.004)
ictinvest -0.001 -0.002 0.003
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
compushare 0.040∗∗∗ 0.013 -0.113∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.023) (0.035)
exportshare 3*10−5 0.003∗∗∗ -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
compprice 4*10−4 -0.007 -0.025
(0.015) (0.024) (0.040)
stdperfwage -0.037∗∗ 0.010 0.113∗
(0.018) (0.027) (0.061)
constant 0.195 0.142 -1.265∗∗∗
(0.170) (0.429) (0.487)
Regions and sectors yes yes yes
Wald test of indep. eqns. 0.11
Wald test 107.89∗∗∗
N 936
Note: ***/**/* indicates significance at the 1/5/10%-level. The values in parentheses represent the robust
standard errors of the coefficients. N indicates the sample size. The coefficients of the sector and regional dummies
are available from the authors upon request.
Source: KOF Innovation Survey 2008, own calculations.
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